1. Theoretical framework for bureaucratic Organisation
Organizations are groups of people, with ideas and resources, working toward common goals. The purpose of the organizing function is to make the best use of the organization's resources to achieve organizational goals. (Morgan, 1986) Further, Morgan (1993) gave the metaphor of machines to describe the organisations. According to him organisation is like a machine and is obedient product of human intelligence. Mintzburg (1979) described a Mechanistic organization as rigid with clearly delineated jobs, well-defined hierarchical structure which relied on a formal chain of command for control. Bureaucratic organizations, with their emphasis on formalization, are the primary form of mechanistic structures.
Weber (1958), described the ‘bureaucracy’ as a rational, goal-directed hierarchy, with impersonal decision-making, formal controls, and subdivision into managerial positions and specialization of labor. The machine bureaucracies coordinated and standardized work processes and specified rules for each task. (Skrtic, 1995)Weber (1958) underlined that the bureaucracy functioned on commands and rules, given by officeholders as trustees of an impersonal rational-legal order. The obedience to these uniform principles symbolized the bureaucratic authority. Spencer (1970), highlighted that, ‘Authority represents polar principles of an organization and was based upon compliance to commands.’
However, over a period the bureaucracy has failed to deliver. Simon (1967) maintained that, ‘politicised agendas are reshaping bureaucracies and playing a crucial role in evacuating bureaucracy of its content and role.’ Merton (1952), emphasized that bureaucracy was suffered from ‘goal displacement’ where by means undermined the ends they were supposed to see. Peters (2001) also found that division of tasks and goals without complete elaboration resulted in mere compliance to rules and reduced efficiency and effectiveness.
These shortcomings have lead to the modern bureaucratic organisations is being reexamined and they are being assigned new roles. This is because it is believed that the ‘‘traditional’’ way of governing society is ill suited to cope with the tasks and circumstances faced. The problem is extended because administrative success also ‘depends on the performance of several actors and institutions organized on different principles and with different cultures, resources, histories, and dynamics.’ (Olsen, 2005) A paradigmatic shift from administering and governing through bureaucracies and hierarchies has been prescribed. (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994)
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) held that modern bureaucracy must be an organisation, which was responsive to the needs of people and gave the concept of ‘agencification’. ‘An ‘executive agency organisation’ is semi-detached from its parent department, with its own budget and freedom from some departmental regulations.’ (James, 2003) It has accountability for the performance of specific operational tasks and personal accountability of the chief executive for performance.
Balakash
The channeling of drugs through Balakash has resulted in several problems. The government is unable to deliver results because of ineffective law enforcement agencies. The present assignment looks ways to modify the government organisational structure to fight against drugs.
Fig. 1: Map of Balakash indicating the drug route
2. Organisational Problems in Balakash Government
a. Macro level problems
Organisational Conflict
In Balakash, there is organisational conflict between Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the NSS on carrying out counter narcotics operations. The bureaucratic roles and power structure do not follow clear-cut hierarchical and organisational lines. These different wings of the government organisation do not communicate with each other and do not know what other groups are doing. They appear to have distorted perceptions of each other. It appears they are competing against each other, and ‘building individual empires.’ The conflict is around autocratic and non-cooperative leadership styles of Ministers and sharing of organisational resources.
Unclear strategy and goals
The anti-narcotics operations do not have a clear cut well defined goal or a mission statement. The strategy is focused on inputs i.e. money spent by each ministry, rather than outputs and outcomes, which is reduction in drug trade or drug users. The targets for counter narcotics operations are ambiguous. They focus on numbers rather than addressing the underlying cause. The Ministries hide their poor performance behind these numbers.
Fig.2: Existing structure of the drug enforcement in Balakash
Overlapping Jurisdictions
The anti-narcotics operations are mainly to be carried by the Ministry of Interior, which works through police (in Bardak), customs service (in Nova Castra), highways police (outside Bardak), anti drugs division (Bardak), and an undercover wing (Alta). The Ministry of Defense controls the military and operates through an anti-narcotics division around Alta and on highways. A bureau called the National Security Service, which has undercover operations. Consequently, the different units undertake operations, which are uncoordinated, unfocussed, and cut into each other’s territory. There is tendency of scoring points over each other rather than delivering results.
Fig.3: Map of Balakash indicating the areas of operational overlap of different ministries
Indeterminate accountability
The accountability for the counter-narcotics operations is undefined. The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense are only concerned about launching operations and arrests but not for drug sales or drug seizures in the international waters by other countries. The Ministry of Education and Social development is concerned about the growing drug use in urban areas and especially schools but it cannot hold the other two Ministries responsible for the same. The arrests are not resulting in convictions due to poor evidentiary work by the enforcement agencies who in turn blame the judiciary for being lenient on the narcotics offenders. Further, due to poor accountability, corruption is spreading and this is resulting in deteriorating law and order, petty crimes, theft and inter-gang conflict in the cities.
b. Micro level problems
Unprofessional combat force
The work force is inadequately trained to carry out the anti-narcotics operations. It is also riddled with corruption and inefficiency. The armed forces also lack the requisite skills of evidence gathering and sustaining criminal proceedings against the narcotics offenders.
No focus on the cause of drug trade
The entire thrust of the counter-narcotics drive is on the offenders and users, but there is no focus on the cause of the problem, which is lack of development in the hill areas and poverty in the urban areas. Consequently, there is conflict between the Ministry of Interior and Governor of Alta on allocation of funds. No funds are allocated to provide alternative livelihoods and demand reduction for the drugs.
Soft legal system
The judicial system does not have separate laws or fast track courts for drug related offences. It also does not have checks to prevent drug related money laundering.
Recommendations
3. Structure of the Agency
The situation in Balakash is too complex for small changes to make an impact and it will be difficult to sustain them. A ‘unified large scale’ program has to be undertaken to create a momentum in the fight against the drugs by unifying all counter-narcotics activities the different ministries. The proposed agency will work on the model of a ‘Coordinating Council’ may be called Counter Narcotics Coordinating Council (CNCC)
Fig.4: Proposed model of Agency: Counter Narcotics Coordinating Council
Design
It is based on five pillars of Law Enforcement, Planning and Institution-Building, Demand Reduction/Alternative Livelihoods, Judicial Reform and Accountability. The council will draw upon the elements of existing institutions and would be capable of working with them.
The council will have five wings:
1. Operational Wing( law enforcement and counter-narcotic operations)
2. Planning Wing (counter narcotics strategy, interagency coordination and training of the armed forces)
3. Judicial Wing(monitoring of judicial trials, judicial reform and anti-money laundering)
4. Social Wing(demand reduction, drug rehabilitation and alternative-livelihoods)
5. Media Wing( interacting with media, preparing reports and accountability)
The agency will co-opt few select and suitable officers and staff the five core functional areas from the different ministries of the government. The staff in the agency will coordinate and supervise their respective ministries falling under their areas of expertise and oversee the work related to their area of operation. They will coordinate among themselves on operational requirements, task orientation and delivery of results.
Fig.5: Implementation structure of the Counter Narcotics Coordination Council
Implementation
Counter Narcotics Fund: To improve coordination and planning, all funds meant for anti-narcotics activities will placed under the Counter Narcotics Coordinating Council as a Counter narcotics Fund. This will ensure more effective resource allocation at all levels.
1. Operational Wing: All the counter-narcotic operations will be re-organized into two specialized forces to any prevent overlap in operational areas. The two forces will focus on two different areas, one will focus on major drug cartels, drug traders and the distribution network and the other will focus on maintaining law and order, guarding ports and highways and controlling small drug crimes. These would be:
a. Counter Narcotics Police of Balakash (CNP). This force will draw the best officers with proven record of accomplishment from the existing police, highway police, customs and port authority. It will create an agency with capability to maintain law and order and conduct operations in cities, ports, highways against illicit drugs targets
b. A Balakash Special Narcotics Force (BSNF), a Para-military force. It will take elements from the NSS, Anti-narcotics division of Military and Anti-narcotics wing of Ministry of Interior. It will have the task of undercover operations, surveillance, counter-intelligence and carrying out raids against high-value targets and drug operatives.
2. The Planning wing: This wing will draw the officers and staff with skills of strategic planning. This will also include officers who will impart specialised training Officers and staff skilled in judicial processes will also be associated to train the forces. The Wing will also include officials with financial background who will supervise allocation of funds and resources.
3. Social Wing: This will include officials from the Ministry of social development, province of Alta and city of Bardak and Nova Castra for carrying rehabilitation work.
4. Judicial Wing: This will draw officials with judicial background who will follow up on trials and look in reforms in the judicial systems to strengthen the law against the drug offenders and speedy trials.
5. Media Wing: They will have officials with PR skills and officials trained in figure and audit work. They will maintain all the data and coordinate with the media and the audit.
4. Role of the Coordinating Council
The coordinating council through its different wings will have to undertake ‘radical steps’ to address the problem. The agency will operate both at the strategic and operational levels.
At the Strategic Level
The agency will have to adopt a ‘multi-pronged approach’, which will include,
1. Launching direct attack on the drug trade through armed forces
2. Preventing movement of drugs through Balakash, seizing drug consignments, arresting and convicting big drug operatives
3. Carrying out sanitisation of customs, ports and the borders to prevent easy drug movement
4. Focusing on curbing drug distribution in the cities
5. Monitoring and preventing drug use among schoolchildren and rehabilitation of existing users.
6. Addressing the issue of poverty in urban poor and hill farmers
7. Efforts to provide alternate livelihood to of hill farmers and urban poor people for shifting dependence on drug trade
8. Strengthening anti-narcotics legislation stricter penalties for drug related offences
9. Stricter controls against money laundering.
Changes at Operative level1. The council will coordinate on uniform distribution of counter-narcotics funds and resources.
2. At the operative level, the council will provide single and unified command for all the counter-narcotics operations.
3. It will ensure a single agency for intelligence gathering, intelligence sharing, operational coordination and follow up on the courts and convictions.
4. It will also train forces for counter-narcotics operations and for inter-unit coordination. 5. It will follow up on trials and look for reforms in the judicial systems to strengthen the law against the drug offenders and speedy trials.
6. It will help in developing a law against money laundering and will coordinate with banks on this.
7. It will maintain all the data on drug seizures, drug offenders, traders, drug users especially schools and young children.
8. It will also coordinate with the media through press releases of the results of the operation.
9. It will also coordinate with the parliament and audit.
10. It will initiate supporting hill farmers in moving away from drug trade and curbing drug use in schools.
Individual ChangesThere would be regular informal exchange of information between different wings at all times. All counter narcotics efforts will be coordinated and collaborated. Besides this:
1. All counter narcotics forces will move under the command of CNCC
2. The Operational wing will directly supervise the anti-narcotics operations by exercising operational control over the two newly created counter narcotics forces.
3. Planning wing will also oversee newly set up training centres for the police force in combat training and evidence gathering.
4. The Social Wing will make resource allocation including separate resource allocation for drug rehabilitation and demand reduction and for hill farmers for agricultural and alternate livelihood support.
5. The judicial wing will also look for judicial reform to strengthen the law drug related offences.
6. The Social wing will coordinate with social authorities for awareness campaign for reducing drug demand and will start health support for drug rehabilitation
7. The Media wing will collect data on data on drug seizures, drug offenders, traders, drug users especially schools and young children. This will be published in media regularly.
8. The media wing will handle the audit and accountability functions.
5. Accountability
Overall accountability of the CouncilThe coordinating council will be vested with significant powers and funds. A suitable accountability mechanism will have to be established which will allow it freedom of operation, transparency and delivery of desired outputs.
1. To the Prime Minister: The Council will be accountable to the Prime Minister for its operational activities and results. It will report to the PM and work under its direct control. The Council chief will be available for briefing the Prime Minister, informally, on a daily basis, or as regularly as feasible. He will report and share full operational details with the PM. The council will have a formal monthly reporting to the PM on the success against drug trade, demand reduction, rehabilitation and alternative farming.
2. To the Parliament: The council will receive all the anti-narcotics funding and for this purpose, it will report to the parliament through a quarterly report on amounts spent and results achieved. This will ensure financial transparency and accountability.
Fig.6: Accountability of CNCC to various oversight bodies
3. To the Auditor General: To have an independent check on the activities of the council, the performance and the accounts of the council will be open to central audit. It will be accountable to the Auditor General of Balakash who would conduct an annual audit of the outputs and outcomes achieved. This audit will however not compromise on the operational capabilities of the counter narcotics forces as details of informers and contacts will have to be kept confidential.
4. To Media and Public: The council will regularly publish its performance and achievements including money spent and will thus be accountable to the public through media. However, the operational details will be outside the preview of the media.
Accountability within the council
Within the council, each wing will be accountable to the council. For operational purposes, the Special Forces will report on a daily basis to the Council chief. The various wings of the council will interact on a daily need basis with each other and will report on a weekly or fortnightly basis to the Council. Each area will be accountable for results within its field of operation; however, the council will ensure proper coordination, unified focus on results, uniform distribution and utilization of resources within different areas.
6. Theoretical Backing for Organisational design
Agency: The suggested solution the coordinating council is based on the concept of an agency. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) The agency creation will result in ‘structural disaggregation.’ This will bring about an unbundling of the bureaucracy or breaking up large-scale ministerial departments into ‘core’ departments. (Talbot, 1999) The focus will be on tackling the ‘drug menace’ rather than meeting the narrow departmental targets.
Project Based Organisation: The model also incorporates the concepts of project-based organisation, (Morgan, 1989) wherein the organisational bureaucrats will have a high degree of functional freedom. They would have an opportunity to exhibit dynamism and innovation in the organisation. (Morgan 1989)
Authority and Legitimacy: The coordinating council has a clearly defined authority, power and legitimacy. Legitimacy provides status with which ‘an organisation is imbued and perceived and enables it to operate with the general consent of peoples and governments.’ (Slim, 2002) The council draws power from the top executive head and is answerable to that authority. This provides the council with ‘legal-rational’ bureaucratic authority to function. (Weber, 1958) The authority will help in effective control and command.
Conflict Avoidance: The council structure will address to the ‘bureaucratic conflict’ by defining hierarchy and ‘system conflict’ by assigning clear functional roles and funds. (Pondy, 1967)
Coordination and collaboration: The utility of the coordination council will be that it will pool resources from all spheres. The council will undertake its core activities through the five wings. Key specialists belong to the wings and make their contributions through their wings. The actions will be coordinated and will bring in the ‘Groupthink Effect’ in committee meetings, and creativity exercises such as "brainstorming", lead to Management By Objectives. (Drucker, 1954)
Professional Bureaucracy: The council in itself provides unity of command and the council chief provides a clear line of command. This will help to avoid jurisdictional overlap and conflict amongst various forces. The makes the council into a ‘professional bureaucracy’ where ‘professionals know the theory behind their work and have the discretion to adapt it to the actual needs’. (Tomlinson, 1982) This it will provide a rational approach for tacking drug trade and drug abuse.
The Flat Hierarchy of the council will increase the coordination and, information flow across the organisation and minimize delays and communication problems. (Urwick, 1956) The council has narrow span of control. (Fayol, 1949) which will allow easy communication and better control. It will also result in quick feedback from the staff.
Theory of action: The council will also be able to provide a ‘theory of action’ or ‘knowledge and a set of causal connections about how to be effective in the world.’ (Argyris & Schön, 1976) This theory of action will provide clear-cut goals to the organisation by incorporating organisational abilities and experiences.
Accountability: Accountability is an important element of any good organisation. ‘It involves being answerable for decisions or actions, often to prevent the misuse of power and other forms of inappropriate behaviour.’ (Barberis, 1998) The council is accountable at various levels for this purpose.
Conclusion
The coordinating council will present a unified, multi-pronged approach in tackling the drug menace. It will reduce organisational conflict and provide coordination & collaboration. It will also address to problem of demand reduction, rehabilitation and provision of alternative livelihoods.
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